Abstract. The increasing difficulties in financing the welfare state and in particular public retirement pensions have been one of the outcomes both of the decrease of fertility and birth rates combined with the increase of life expectancy. The dynamics of retirement pensions are usually studied in Economics using overlapping generation models. These models are based on simplifying assumptions like the use of a representative agent to ease the problem of tractability. Alternatively, we propose to use agent-based modelling (ABM), relaxing the need for those assumptions and enabling the use of interacting and heterogeneous agents assigning special importance to the study of inter-generational relations. We treat pension dynamics both in economics and political perspectives. The model we build, following the ODD protocol, will try to understand the dynamics of choice of public versus private retirement pensions resulting from the conflicting preferences of different agents but also from the cooperation between them. The aggregation of these individual preferences is done by voting. We combine a microsimulation approach following the evolution of synthetic populations along time, with the ABM approach studying the interactions between the different agent types. Our objective is to depict the conditions for the survival of the public pensions system emerging from the relation between egoistic and altruistic individual and collective behaviours.
Introduction
Retirement pensions remains an important issue due to the increasing difficulties to finance the welfare state. The decrease of fertility and birth rates combined with the increase of life expectancy contribute to population ageing, which has as a consequence an increase of dependency rates: fewer workers have to pay pensions for more old retirees [8] .
These problems have led governments all over the world to design and implement parametric or structural reforms on pension systems.
To understand these reforms and generally the impact of population ageing on pension systems, it is necessary to take into account the voter's preferences and the underlying political environment [21] . Voters choose policy alternatives by election, lobbying, or by campaigning to influence the Government.
In the case of retirement, different age groups. young, older workers, and retirees, all have different preferences about pension policies. The direction of policy reform, results from the aggregate of individual preferences. One of the ways to accomplish this aggregation is through the electoral process.
As such, we argue that pension policy is mainly a political problem and any reform of a pension scheme, being parametric or non-parametric, is redistributional [21] , involving necessarily winners and losers and by that reason is a politically very contested issue.
Our aim is to examine the intra and intergenerational political dynamics of retirement pensions systems, using agent-based modelling (ABM). We will try to depict the dynamics of choice of public versus private retirement pensions. These dynamics have been initially studied on the basis of overlapping generations (OLG) models [22] .
Using ABM to study the the dynamics of retirement pensions enables to understand the evolution of agents according to age and also to the generation to which they belong, over time. Usually in economics, OLG models are based on assumptions that are not always realistic, to ease the problem of tractability. One of the advantages of ABM is to be able to relax them. Relaxing these assumptions is expected to ease the understanding of complex processes and to produce more realistic results. Within ABM it is possible to include in the analysis multiple variables as the rate of electoral participation (one of the ways of exercising or influencing power) by age and other variables, or the existence of income inequalities and savings between younger, older workers and pensioners. Or even, to contemplate personal bonds between particular individuals in different generational groups (e.g. individuals belonging to the same family), that could harbour and foster particular positions not similar to the preferences that would otherwise exist between anonymous agents.
We build a model that accounts for the resilience of retirement pensions systems, mainly of unfunded pensions, and the persistance of a norm that implies that "young workers agree to pay the pension of retired people in return for the promise that the next generation of workers will pay for their pension" [5] .
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Objectives, reasons and schemes of retirement pensions
There are two main objectives of retirement pensions: the first, called "piggybank" function of pensions, aims to provide insurance against low income and wealth in old age. It is a mechanism of consumption smoothing across lifetime. The second, the "Robin Hood" function, aims to relieve poverty and redistribute income and wealth [3, 4, 5] .
Different reasons justify the introduction of some form of welfare arrangements: the impact of urbanization, industrialization and the demise of the extended family; the extension of voting rights or the increasing strength of left parties and labor unions [21, p. 55] and also long-term change of values related to increased democratisation and the value of all human lives.
There are two main schemes of pension arrangements: a PAYG (pay-as-you-go) system where current workers pay current retirees' pension through a tax that is levied on their working incomes: and a pre-funded system, when contributions are invested in assets that are accumulated as capital. Benefits for retirees result from a previous generated stock of funds.
Pension contributions can be mandatory or voluntary. The need for a mandatory public system is usually justified by two reasons:
-the first reason is myopic individual saving behaviour, since short-sighted individuals do not save sufficiently for their retirement. Individuals tend to revise their consumption plans in an inconsistent way by using a higher discount rate for the near future than the far future. -the second reason has to do with imperfect financial markets. Private financial markets do not provide sufficient possibilities for annuitization of pension benefits due to "adverse selection problems" [7] i.e. because of asymmetric information. "In most countries private markets for life annuities are rudimentary, probably because, where life annuities are not mandatory, the individuals who buy them tend on average to be wealthier and to have longer life expectancies" [23] .
These reasons would justify a paternalistic government intervention.
Pensions in the Economics perspective
The overlapping generations model (OLG) (Diamond-Samuelson Overlapping Generations Model with Certain Lifetimes) has been used to represent the individual's life-cycle behaviour. It deals with the aggregate behaviour of individuals and generalizes the lifecycle model. The original OLG model was developed by Samuelson [22] and Diamond [6] . In this model, in each period t it is considered that two or three generations are alive: workers and pensioners on the simplest version of OLG and young workers, old workers and pensioners, on the three generations version. This simplification of the number of cohorts existing in each period makes the analysis tractable. The assumption of considering two or three ageing homogeneous groups has consequences: emphasizing age groups and not individuals; presupposing group homogeneity behaviour and not heterogeneity. These modelling restrictions are not a valid limitation for an ABM approach, since it is possible to simulate populations with a distribution of ages closer to the reality of any group or country.
The relationship between age groups on retirement pensions may be seen through the lens of political theory.
These kinds of models show that coalition building might be important. The literature has suggested that retirees and older workers may conspire, and that an elaborated intergenerational punishment mechanism ensures sustainability of the system once it has been introduced. [21, p. 15] Some authors from the field of political economy even support the thesis of a "grey conspiracy", i.e. a conspiracy of pensioners and older workers, against the interests of the young [21, 18] . Nevertheless it is also known that sometimes older people is altruistic to the younger generations providing the young that are outside the system due to unemployment or low wages.
Inter-generational behaviour can also result from intra-generational distribution of attributes: intra-generational inequality may arouse altruism from workers towards old people and, for that motive, reinforce public pension systems.
Pensions in the Political Science perspective
The existence of different demographic and economic scenarios convey different individual preferences resulting in different economic policies [9] . The aggregation of individual preferences is done through the electoral process using two different types of electoral institutions: direct democracy or a representative democracy.
In the first case, voter's preferences are aggregated by direct referendum. The decisive variable is the population growth rate as it determines which age group contains the median voter [21] . This scheme implies the simplifying reasoning that decision depends solely on self-interest, which in turn is determined by age and work status. There are three possible cases: a) if the median voter belongs to the young age group then, pre-funded pension systems based on individual savings would be favoured; b) if it belongs to retirees, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system will be maintained or reinforced, even if it would be necessary to change the contribution rate; and c) finally, the position of old workers about pension reform depends on the size of the existing pension scheme (more generous pensions implies decisions similar to those of the retirees).
In the second case, in which preferences are aggregated within a representative democracy, political parties and the electoral system becomes important. In the framework of a probabilistic voting model, where voters are imperfectly informed about candidates, and candidates are also imperfectly informed about the utility preferences of voter's preferences, the number of swing voters becomes the decisive variable [21, 16] . If the political representation is proportional, parties compete for swing voters. Thus, the age group with the highest number of swing voters would see their preferences respected by parties that want to win the election.
Parties normally favour the preferences of the old in their electoral programmes, because old people are not only more "singleminded" (meaning that their core interest is the value of pensions), but they are also ideologically more homogeneous [21] .
Some studies explain why a voting majority favours a PAYG pension system [22, 1] . The basic idea is that in a dynamically inefficient economy, a situation characterised by the possibility of making one generation better off without making any other generation worse off, a PAYG saving device would improve the overall welfare if the rate of interest r is smaller than the population growth rate n. In this situation, the internal rate of return i of a PAYG system is higher than the real return of capital accumulation.
The internal rate of return (IRR) measures an investment's rate of return. It is named internal because it excludes external factors, such as inflation. The IRR is the "discount rate that equates the present value of pension benefits with the present value of contributions" [5] .
In the case of a PAYG system, the investment is the negative payment flow of contributions and the pay-off of this investment is the positive flow of the the benefits received during the pension phase. As such the IRR is "measured as the proportion of the size of benefits to the size of contributions" [25, 24] .
The internal rate of return from this scheme (i) depends on the product of the product of the working population growth rate n by the growth rate of wages w, according to the classical equation [22] :
where, i = Internal Rate of Return n = Population growth rate w = Wages growth rate r = Rate of interest Under this situation everyone would be better off contributing to the PAYG system than to invest in assets. For this reason, a system like this is unanimous and undisputed by all voters.
However, if the assumption of dynamic inefficiency is disregarded, this voter's behaviour becomes far from being consensual, since in this case it is possible that some generation(s) would be better off than others.
In the political economics framework of the OLG model one can find usually several assumptions like the existence of an imperfect capital market, or the voter's decisions being dealt with like a one-shot vote, binding all future generations [21] . There are even other assumptions, such as the fact that voters are not altruistic towards other generations, people of the same age group being homogeneous, with the same preferences and sharing the same utility function:
where, for example,
] is the utility of consumption (c) of older workers (o) in period t + 1. Other assumptions used traditionally in Economics include: the use of a representative agent (by generation) as a typical decision-maker; that decision on Social Security is done by majority voting; that population growth has a constant rate n; and also that wage rate is exogenous and constant.
None of these assumptions are mandatory when using a ABM approach, since it is possible to simulate any level of heterogeneity for each generation.
Another simplifying assumption is that "utility in every period of life is only dependent on the level of personal consumption c" [21] .
According to the usual OLG notation, in each period t there are N i t individuals, where the superscript i ∈ {y, o, r} denotes the generation of young workers, old workers or retirees respectively. One important and restrictive assumption is that every generation N i , and the population as a whole, grow with a constant rate n [21, p. 54]:
Consumption during working age and after retirement is determined by wage rate w, saving rate s and contribution rate to the pension system τ . Working age individuals divide their income between consumption, savings and contributions to be transferred as lump-sum to retirees. Pensioners derive their retirement consumption from the public pension x and the accumulated savings, which earn an interest rate r [21, p. 55]. These are all simplifying assumptions that can be deepened and nuanced in subsequent analysis [13] .
Some of the limitations of the OLG model are the use of two or three generations, and not individuals with some age heterogeneity and the use of a representative agent as a typical decision-maker, as well as considering that people of the same group are homogeneous, i.e. have the same preferences, and treating age rate and population growth as exogenous and constant.
As the only choice variable is the contribution rate to pensions (τ ), the result of the vote on pension system "depends on the preferences of the three generations and their relative sizes" [21] .
In this model young workers only support the introduction of a PAYG scheme if the population growth rate exceeds the interest rate in a economy dynamically inefficient. Retirees only have the contribution rate as a choice variable. For older workers, we can say that the closer an individual is to retirement, the more profitable the introduction of a public pension system becomes. We can conclude that "both old workers and retirees vote in favor of a PAYG scheme" [21, p. 57] .
The preference ordering of the three generations is therefore:
Assuming a direct majority vote, the relative sizes of the three age groups and the identity of the median voter will dictate the outcome. Contradicting this model that presupposes an equivalence between group and voter size, it is possible using the agent-based model alternative perspective to take into account that vote turnout rate diverge by age and so the identity of the median voter may be relatively independent of the age group size. As voter turnout is normally positively related to age it can reinforce the probability of older median voter.
In the case of pension politics as a repeated voting game, we can ask ourselves what makes self-interested individuals introduce and maintain a pension system. It could be the result of a social contract between generations, enforced by either through punishment or reputation.
It seems that other factors, such as majority voting combined with altruism or intra-generational heterogeneity, would give better explanations to the political sustainability of public pension systems. But altruism does not generalize to culturally different countries.
PAYG pension systems not only transfer resources from the young to the retired, but also from the better off to the worse off, contributing to some intra-generational redistribution. This is one of the main keys to understand why the preference for public pension systems is income inequality, measured for example by the worker's wage relative to the average income.
Pension systems, are commonly divided into two broad classes: they are organized according to the principles of either the Beveridgean or the Bismarckian tradition. Conceptionally, a Bismarckian pension system is characterized by a close link between previous earnings (and contributions when we assume that the latter are collected as payroll taxes) and today's benefits. A Beveridgean pension system, on the other hand, provides a basic or minimum pension. The resulting measure of the level of intragenerational redistribution in the public pension system may be referred to as the Bismarckian factor.
In a "pure" Beveridgean pension system, every pensioner receives the same pension benefit, independent of his/her (previous) household income. Here, the Bismarckian factor assumes a value of zero.
Under a "pure" Bismarckian pension system, benefits are proportional to previous earnings/contributions, i.e. pension benefits exhibit the same level of inequality as earnings. Accordingly, the Bismarckian factor equals one.
Let Y i and P i , denote the mean income and the mean pension benefit, respectively, of the i th quintile of the income distribution (i ∈ B(ottom), 2, 3, 4, T (op)). A purely Bismarckian pension system implies
Y T , and a purely Beveridgean pension system implies P B = P T . The pension benefit of a representative member of quintile i, P i , is defined as a convex combination of a flat payment (proportional to the mean income) and an earnings-related component (proportional to Y i ):
where ξ ∈ [0, 1] is the Bismarckian or redistribution factor µ = i Y i /5 is mean income of a society and τ ≡ i P i / i Y i ∈ [0, 1] the 'generosity index', a measure of the level of redistribution between generations [15] .
The higher ξ the less intra-generational redistribution takes place. (ξ = 0 indicates a perfect Beveridgean system).
Model
To define the model we use, we partially follow the ODD (Overview, Design concepts, Details) protocol [10] .
Purpose
This model will try to show the dynamics of choice of public versus private retirement pensions. It will try to explain the resilience of retirement pensions systems, mainly of unfunded pensions.
Our objective is to to study variation of favorability of heterogeneous agents to public pensions (PAYG).
Some of the hypotheses to test are:
1. preferences for a big public PAYG system increase with age;
2. older workers policy preferences depend on population growth and on the size of the existing pension scheme.
In order to evaluate the favorability to public pensions it is possible to compute cohort-specific rates of return. Individuals that belong to cohorts that due to the fact of evaluating positively the sum of their contribution payments are expecting greater internal rates of return may have a greater chance to be more favorable to public pensions. Rates of return can be computed for different demographic groups (single men, single women and married couples) and different scenarios (retirement at the statutory retirement age, retirement at earlier ages etc.). This is a deterministic approach, contrasting with a stochastic approach where the expected payment flows includes longevity, survival risks as well as the time of retirement.
To calculate the rates of return we have to consider the flux of (negative) contribution payments and (positive) pension benefits to be discounted to a common date, which is the date of entry to the labor force. The internal rate of return is the rate at which the net present value of benefits received, equalizes the net present value of contributions paid: It is impossible for agents to have complete knowledge of the internal rate of return, population and wages growth or the rate of interest. In the absence of a situation of absolute rationality, favorability to public pensions and decisions about retirement can only be understood in a situation of limited knowledge and bounded rationality.
To model their beliefs agents are classified into three categories: one minority that adopts quasi-optimal behavior, another minority that adopts random behavior, and a majority of agents who mimic members of their social networks [2] , social circles [12, 11] or contexts [19] .
Entities, state variables, and scales
Agents The agents in the model will be composed by: individuals (i); Government (G); and two competing political parties (P L and P R ).
Individuals These are the model parameters of individuals:
-age: discrete value ∈ [0; 100] -age-category: four ordered generations (children, young (workers); adult; old); -Gender (male, female), because there are several variable gender related, as employment rate, civil status, life expectation and couple coordination in time to retirement.
-Employment status: inactive, employed/unemployed and pensioner; Note: all individuals aged 65+ are pensioners.
propensity to vote for party x. -political influence of workers and pensioners (φ ∈ [0; 1]) -contribution rate to the pension system (Social Security)(τ = 0.11w (gross wage rate)). For self-employed individuals 29,6%. -consumption rate (c) -saving rate (s = 5.6%) -wage rate (w = 17240 A C by year) or Income (I) (distribution of income depends on age)
[make income and wage equivalent in a first phase]; -welfare favorability (towards retirement public pensions) (0 ≤ wf ≤ 1) i.e. probability of voting for policies/parties favorable to welfare state (older workers are ideologically more homogeneous than others [21] ); -choice of type of pension regime: PAYG or private/funded.
Government is another entity which can change contribution rates to the public pension system (τ ) according to individual income (I); it also pays (public) pensions: this implies the need for a computation mechanism of a greater or lesser favorability to use pensions as redistribution. It can also change wages in public w Political parties To simulate aggregation of preferences that use indirect voting (political parties), we simplify using only two political parties (P L and P R ). One of the attributes of both parties is common popularity (δ), which is operationalized as a random variable:
It is conceptualized as a random variable, which is uniformly distributed on (
, has a mean of zero and cannot be controlled by the competing parties. It is being realized after all policy platforms have been chosen and therefore captures all the imponderables of electoral competitions where scandals may be revealed or foreign policy events (war, terrorist attack) intervene. [21, p.92-93] Global aggregate variables Auxiliary variables were added for monitoring characteristics of the whole population:
-dependency-ratio (dr = (young + old)/adults) depends on the level of the components. The value for Portugal in 2015 was 53.5%. Young = people < 15 years; Old = 65+ years; -population (natural) growth rate (n = −0.22% (2015)) -wage growth rate (W ) -real interest rate (R) -relative political influence of workers (φ ∈ [0; 1]) -transfers between adults and young/old (PAYG scheme): T = I r , where r = rate -redistribution factor relating contributions to benefits (ξ ∈ [0, 1], where ξ = 0 is a perfect Beveridgean (high redistribution) and ξ = 1 is a Bismarckian situation (low redistribution)
Spatial units A two-dimensional L × L square lattice; L = 100 for n = 1000 agents.
Process overview and scheduling
Agent-based modelling is used to simulate individuals that make decisions that can impact on the retirement system as lobbying and voting (direct voting or using parties) for different systems [14, 17] .
Demography The demographic characteristics of population are fundamental to define the contours of the mechanisms of the simulation. A demographic microsimulation is run parallel to the agent-based simulation. The microsimulation determines for each individual all demographic states that an individual will experience throughout his life and the amount of time the individual will spent in each state. See Table 1 for state variables and respective possible values. It is possible to define a matrix of transition states (and probabilities of transition between states). Examples of transitions:
and widowhood rates) -Fertility status: 0→1, 1→2, 2→3+ and 3+→3+ (fertility rates) -Employment status: ie → e; e → u; e → r; u → r; u → e (employment and unemployment rates) -Mortality: alive → dead (absortion state) (death rates) -Birth: each female in any simulation year can give birth to a child, with a probability which is year-and age-specific and is reported in a file. -Employment: all individuals who are of working age (>15) and whose previous work state was neither student nor retired are considered to be available to work. Conditional on this, individuals are employed with a probability which depends on age, lagged work state (either employed, unemployed or inactive): regression coefficients are stored in a file. -Death: death is also a probabilistic event, with year and age-specific death probabilities contained in a file. All individuals die at age 100.
One time step represents one year, and simulations will be run for 50 years.
Initialization
Initial populations from two countries, starting with Portugal (using sample databases from IPUMS -Minnesota Population Center International Database Project -or the OECD database: [20]) with different welfare state systems (pension systems) will be used. The features of the countries are based on real countries. The initial population is a synthetic population normally used on microsimulation studies (see R package MicSim [26] ). Some population features that it will be necessary to monitor during the study: The policy decisions (pension parametric reforms) of the two parties are the following:
-P L increases contributions to Social Security (τ ) and/or decreases retirement age and/or increases pensions; -P R decreases contributions to Social Security (τ ) and/or increase retirement age and/or decreases pensions.
Concluding Remarks and Further Research Directions
The model presented above needs to be operationalized, and a reflection of their results must be done. Nevertheless, it is possible even beforehand to present some remarks that we think will be useful for further research. When a population subset (intermediated or not by a party), wins an election, it can never win on every issue. It will always lose in some aspect. The winner party, favouring public pensions, may simultaneously harm other equally desirable policies (e.g. public transportation, health, children). Public investment is scarce, and choices must be made.
Choosing a party by vote may induce some feedback on every agent because they all will be affected by choice, one way or another. It is possible to think in an initially randomly distributed ideology favouring one party or another. This factor could be changed along with time and circumstances of the simulation. Even altruism may be considered to be initially randomly distributed in the simulation. Altruism represents consideration to other people, knowledge and intergenerational relationship. It works as a point of resistance to selfish choices.
The distribution of agents by the three generations considered by the OLG model is done as a function of age and work status and not generation belonging. This fact means that it will be regarded as only two generation types: workers (with different ages) and pensioners. Old workers with 65 or more years will be considered as pensioners.
The level of favorability to Welfare State or the probability to vote for P L is a stochastic function of age. Younger people have less likelihood of favouring Welfare State. Also, younger people have a less voter turnout level.
In the initialization of the simulation, we can consider that some agents may know almost correctly the internal rate of return. However, they should be a minority and distributed randomly.
One of the most decisive factors in the simulation will be income and inequality level because it has a significant impact on consumption and savings. When there are not enough savings, there is no motivation for investment on pension funds. However, income and inequality are not generated by the simulation, being exogenous parameters, assuming different values in different simulation rounds.
Also, the wage rate (w) and interest rate (r) will be treated as exogenous, functioning only as parameters in the behaviour space.
It is possible in the model to simulate a more Bismarckian or Beveridgian system pension, controlling the ξ parameter in the following equation, or the inter-generational redistribution, controlling the parameter τ .
Favouring public pensions is a function of the expectation of the internal rate of return. This expectation is an idea, real or unreal that the contributions to pensions by some individual will be fairly rewarded in the future, after retirement. The construction of this idea considers the level of the sum of contributions during all the period until retirement. This construction implies that the age of entry into the labour force, the level of wages and the official contribution rate and the age of retirement, are factors to take into account.
More imponderable factors, like life expectation at the time of retirement and substitution rate, are also decisive factors of the internal rate of return function.
